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BibliometricsThe philosophical study of mind in the twentieth century was dominated by a research
program that used a priori methods to address foundational questions. Since that time,
however, the philosophical study of mind has undergone a dramatic shift. To provide a
more accurate picture of contemporary philosophical work, I compared a sample of highly
cited philosophy papers from the past five years with a sample of highly cited philosophy
papers from the twentieth century. In the twentieth century sample, the majority of papers
used purely a priori methods, while only a minority cited results from empirical studies. In
the sample from the past five years, the methodology is radically different. The majority of
papers cite results from empirical studies, a sizable proportion report original experimental
results, and only a small minority are purely a priori. Overall, the results of the review
suggest that the philosophical study of mind has become considerably more integrated
into the broader interdisciplinary field of cognitive science.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.0. Introduction
The twentieth century saw the rise of a quite specific
approach to the philosophical study of mind. It would be
difficult to spell out explicitly all of the elements that
defined this approach, but at the very minimum, it seems
that it was characterized by the following two features:
(1a) The philosophical study of mind was not supposed
to rely on the results of empirical studies. It was
supposed to proceed through a priori reasoning.
(1b) The philosophical study of mind was not supposed
to be concerned with questions about the workings
of specific cognitive processes. It was supposed to
be concerned with more distinctively philosophical
questions regarding the metaphysics of mind (the
mind–body problem, the nature of content, etc.).Because this research program was so influential at the
time, it has done a lot to shape the perception of philosophy
within the broader cognitive science community.Many cog-
nitive scientists probably assume that contemporary philo-
sophical research is still continuing within that same basic
paradigm. In actual fact, however, nothing could be further
from the case. Over the past few decades, the philosophical
study of mind has undergone a rather dramatic shift. There
has been a stark decrease in interest in the approach that
dominated the philosophical study ofmind in the twentieth
century and a corresponding increase in interest in a very
different sort of approach. More specifically:
(2a) At this point, the vast majority of papers in the
philosophical study of mind engage in some way
with the results of empirical studies.
(2b) The field is no longer dominated by research on
metaphysical questions. Instead, the majority of
papers are concerned with questions about the
workings of specific cognitive processes (social cog-
nition, causal cognition, moral cognition, etc.).
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of just how radically philosophical work on the mind has
changed. It therefore seemed helpful to provide some
quantitative data.1. Quantitative review: Highly cited papers in
philosophy journals, 1960–1999 vs. 2009–2013
To do this, I turned to the entry on ‘Philosophy’ in
Google Scholar Metrics. This source lists the twenty most
highly cited philosophy journals from the past five years
(2009–2013) and, within each of those journals, the most
highly cited papers. In total, the list comprises 397 papers.
Then, to compare these papers with a sample of twenti-
eth century work, I took the list of journals from Google
Scholar Metrics, entered it into Web of Science and picked
the 397 most highly cited papers from those journals from
a period in the twentieth century (1960–1999). In other
words, I gathered two samples of philosophy papers, con-
sisting of highly cited papers from the same list of journals
but at two different time periods.
The review was conducted by coding these papers into
categories and then comparing results for the two time
periods. Inevitably, such coding will involve a certain
amount of subjective judgment, and other researchers
might reasonably have decided to include this or that spe-
cific paper in a different category. Nonetheless, my sense
was that a quantitative approach like this one could pro-
vide far more information than could be obtained from a
purely qualitative review. (The entire list of papers and
their codes appears in Supplementary Materials.)
I began by selecting the subset of papers that were
concerned with questions about the mind. This subset
included papers pursuing traditional sorts of questions in
the philosophy of mind, papers concerned with questions
in the philosophy of cognitive science, and also papers that
reported original psychological studies. The subset
contained a total of 85 twentieth century papers and 157
contemporary papers.1.1. Frequencies of methods
I first coded each paper for the method it employed.1
Specifically, I coded the papers into three categories:
(a) Those that use only a priori reasoning and do not
rely on results of empirical studies.
(b) Those that actually report original empirical results.
(c) Those that do not report original empirical results
but do rely on the results of empirical studies
published elsewhere.
Before reading onward, it might be helpful to make a
guess about the relative size of the first two categories
within contemporary research. So try taking a guess: are1 Because this particular coding was so central to the present argument, I
asked a research assistant to code a randomly selected subset of the papers
(comprising 50 of the 157 contemporary papers). Interrater reliability was
92%, j = .85.there more papers that rely solely on a priori reasoning,
or are there more that report the results of experiments
conducted by philosophers?
First, let’s consider the papers from the twentieth cen-
tury sample. It turns out that the majority of these papers
(62.4%) are purely a priori, with a minority (37.6%) relying
on existing empirical research and none at all (0%) report-
ing original experimental results. This first result should
come as no surprise. It simply reflects the well-known
focus of twentieth century research in the philosophical
study of mind.
But now suppose we turn to the contemporary papers.
There we find a completely different distribution. The
majority of papers (61.8%) rely on empirical research, a
substantial proportion (26.8%) report original experimen-
tal results, and only a small minority (11.5%) are purely a
priori.
Of course, one might worry that the method employed
here provides a picture of the field that is biased in one
direction or another. For this reason, one might reasonably
be reluctant to use this method to arrive at any definite
conclusions regarding the type of research being con-
ducted in any given time period. Still, it does seem that this
method can provide helpful information about the differ-
ence between time periods. We are looking at highly cited
papers within the same set of journals at two different
time periods, and if we find a difference between the
two, we thereby acquire strong reason to conclude that
something important within philosophical practice has
changed.
As Fig. 1 shows, the difference observed in this dataset
is surprisingly substantial. The majority of the twentieth
century papers used purely a priori methods, whereas this
approach appears only in a small minority of the contem-
porary papers. Conversely, there were no papers at all in
the twentieth century sample that reported original exper-
imental results, but original experimental results actually
appear in a sizeable proportion of the contemporary
sample.
1.2. Frequencies of topics
I then categorized each paper in terms of the topic it
took up. The full list of papers and topics can be found in
Supplementary Materials. To provide a summary here, I list
all topics represented by more than one paper.
For the twentieth century papers, the distribution of
topics was as follows:
The Mind–Body Problem (17 papers)
The Nature of Content (14 papers)
Self-Knowledge (6 papers)
Perception (5 papers)
Consciousness (4 papers)
Intention (3 papers)
Desire (2 papers)
Qualia (2 papers)
Memory (2 papers)
Theory of Mind (2 papers)
Emotion (2 papers)
Fictional Emotions (2 papers)
Fig. 1. Highly cited papers by method in a sample of twentieth century papers vs. in a sample of contemporary papers.
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topics as aspects of a closely related set of issues in the
metaphysics of mind.
The distribution of topics in the contemporary papers,
however, is radically different:
Perception (14 papers)
Knowledge attribution (11 papers)
Theory of mind and social cognition (11 papers)
Moral cognition (10 papers)
Extended mind (7 papers)
Consciousness (7 papers)
Mind perception (6 papers)
Intentional action judgments (5 papers)
Free will judgments (5 papers)
Embodied cognition (4 papers)
Joint action (4 papers)
Psychology of language (4 papers)
Causal judgments (4 papers)
Foundational issues in neuroscience (3 papers)
Enactivism (3 papers)
Introspection (3 papers)
Trust (3 papers)
Attention (3 papers)
Self-Knowledge (2 papers)
Mental causation (2 papers)
The Nature of Content (2 papers)
Concepts (2 papers)
Intention (2 papers)
Phenomenal concepts (2 papers)
Knowing how (2 papers)
Memory (2 papers)
The first thing to notice here is the rather spectacular
decline in interest in the topics that dominated twentieth
century research in the philosophical study of mind. At this
point, there are hardly any papers on the mind–body prob-
lem, the nature of content, or any other topics in the meta-
physics of mind.
The second thing to notice is the rise of a very different
sort of research program. Contemporary papers in the
philosophical study of mind are concerned primarily with
the attempt to investigate specific aspects of cognition.
They tend not to be aimed at addressing metaphysical
questions but instead to be engaged in an effort to usesystematic empirical data to gain a better understanding
of how these aspects of cognition actually work.
More specifically, there has been a surge of research
looking in detail at the cognitive processes that give rise
to people’s judgments about philosophically relevant mat-
ters (morality, knowledge, causation, etc.). If we consider
all topics that fall within this general research program,
including those represented only by a single paper, we find
45 papers in total. Thus, this program has a fair claim to be
considered the dominant one in the contemporary philo-
sophical study of mind.2. Discussion
The present review compared highly cited papers in the
philosophical study of mind from a contemporary period
(2009–2013) with papers from the twentieth century
(1960–1999). The two periods differed both in method
and in topic. In method, one finds a strong shift toward
the use of systematic empirical data, including original
experiments conducted by philosophers. In topic, one finds
a shift toward the exploration of specific aspects of
cognition.
Clearly, these two shifts are quite closely related. Both
reflect the degree to which the philosophical study of mind
has become integrated within the interdisciplinary field of
cognitive science. There appears to be an emerging
consensus that philosophers do not necessarily need to
develop special methods or topics that set them apart from
researchers in other disciplines. Instead, philosophers are
becoming increasingly engaged with the methods and
topics that characterize this broader interdisciplinary
field.
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Supplementary data associated with this article can be
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